Personal Torts by Powers, William Jr.
SMU Law Review
Volume 39




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




William Powers, Jr. *
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Defectiveness
R Y Instructions for Design Defects. Few issues in the law of products
iability have caused Texas courts more difficulty than the definition of a
design defect and the appropriate instruction to convey this definition to
the jury. After several attempts at resolving these issues,' the Texas
Supreme Court settled on a standard jury instruction in 1979 in Turner v.
General Motors Corp. :2 "By the term 'defectively designed' as used in this
issue is meant a product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking
into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its
use." 3 The court expressly rejected a more detailed instruction directing the
jury to consider several specific factors in determining whether a product's
design is defective.4
Turner did not lay the issue to rest, however. In 1983, in Fleishman v.
Guadiano,5 the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err by
refusing to give a supplemental instruction directing the jury to ignore the
plaintiff's contributory negligence when determining whether the product
was defectively designed. 6 This year, in Acord v. General Motors Corp. ,7 the
supreme court held that the trial court committed reversible error by in-
structing the jury in addition to the standard Turner instruction that a man-
ufacturer is not an insurer of his product and is not required to design an
accident-proof product.8 The court recognized that the additional instruc-
* B.A., University of California (Berkeley); J.D., Harvard Law School; James R.
Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, The Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law.
1. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), overruled in
part by Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979), and Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519
S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974), overruled in part by Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844,
851 (Tex. 1979), and Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984).
2. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
3. Id. at 847 n.1.
4. Id. at 848.
5, 651 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1983).
6. Id. at 731.
7. 669 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984).
8. Id. at 113, 116.
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tion correctly reflected Texas law9 and had been approved by two courts of
appeals. 10 Nevertheless, the court disapproved of the supplemental instruc-
tion as an inappropriate comment on the evidence by the trial judge." I
Following closely on the heels of Fleishman, Acord will likely cause trial
courts to be reluctant to depart from the precise wording of the instruction
that was approved in Turner. Had the supreme court merely disapproved
prospectively the specific instruction the trial court gave in Acord, trial
courts would have learned of the impropriety of the instruction without be-
ing chilled from adapting their instructions to special situations in the fu-
ture. By reversing the judgment the supreme court has sent a very different
message to trial courts around the state.
The mere fact that the specific instruction in Acord was consistent with
legal doctrine does not necessarily mean that the instruction should have
been approved. One objective of Turner was to approve an instruction that
reflects a balance between simplicity and accuracy in order to inform the
jury without confusing it.12 If jurors were instructed fully about the law of
design defects, they would be hopelessly confused. Nevertheless, the fact
that the supplemental instruction was at least accurate might have led the
court merely to disapprove it only prospectively.
One potential improvement in the Turner instruction concerns its provi-
sions that the jury balance the risk and utility of the product in question.
The appropriate test would require the jury to balance the risk and utility of
the design feature that caused the injury instead of the product as a whole.
For example, Ford Pintos were defectively designed not because the overall
risks of Pintos outweighed their overall benefits, but because the risks of the
gas tank's design outweighed the utility of that design. 3 Under the Turner
instruction as it is now worded, admitting evidence of safer alternative de-
signs makes no sense. A comparison of the overall risks and utility of a
product unduly favors the defendant.
Warning Defects: "No Duty" Doctrine. In Dixon v. Van Waters & Rogers14
the Fort Worth court of appeals held that the trial court correctly instructed
the jury that a manufacturer has no duty to warn users who have actual
knowledge of a product's dangerous characteristics and risks.15 Further-
more, the court held that Parker v. Highland Park, Inc.,16 which abolished
the "no duty" doctrine in negligence, does not apply to strict tort liability.' 7
The court's reasoning was somewhat elliptical but relied on the fact that the
9. Id. at 116.
10. See McCants v. Salameh, 608 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Wenzel v. Rollins Motor Co., 598 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. 669 SW.2d at 116.
12. 584 S.W.2d at 848-49.
13. Anton v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270, 1281 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
14. 674 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. Id. at 482.
16. 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).
17. 674 S.W.2d at 483.
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assumption of risk defense has not been abolished in strict liability cases. 8
Implicit in the court's reasoning was that when Parker abolished the "no
duty" doctrine in negligence, Farley v. M M Cattle Co. 19 had already abol-
ished assumption of risk as an independent defense in negligence cases.
20
Since assumption of risk had not been abolished in strict tort liability, the
''no duty" doctrine remained valid.
The Dixon court did not include any discussion of Duncan v. Cessna Air-
craft Co.,21 in which the supreme court recognized contributory negligence
as a comparative defense in strict tort liability.22 In Duncan the court also
held that assumption of risk is subsumed into contributory negligence, sug-
gesting that it is no longer a defense independent of contributory negli-
gence.23 Consequently, assumption of risk no longer supports the adoption
of a "no duty" doctrine in strict tort liability. Duncan should have the same
effect on the "no duty" doctrine in strict liability that Farley had on the "no
duty" doctrine in negligence. 24
After Duncan the plaintiff's knowledge of a product's risks should reduce
the plaintiff's recovery under comparative causation rather than bar recov-
ery under a "no duty" component of the requirement of defectiveness. 25
Elimination of the "no duty" component does not mean, however, that user
knowledge of a product's risks is irrelevant to the question of defectiveness.
If a product's risks are obvious or well known in the community, a failure to
warn might not render the product defective. A knife is not defective be-
cause it does not carry a warning that it might cut the user.26 If a product is
defective for failure to warn general users about risks, however, an individ-
ual user's actual knowledge of the risks should implicate contributory negli-
gence and comparative causation, not defectiveness under a "no duty"
doctrine.
Aside from the issue of defectiveness, an individual user's knowledge of a
product's risks may also affect the issue of causation. If a user is already
aware of a product's risks, the manufacturer could argue that a warning
would have no effect. Consequently, the absence of a warning, although a
18. Id.; see General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977); Sham-
rock Fuel and Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 783-84 (Tex. 1967).
19. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
20. Id. at 758.
21. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); see infra text accompanying notes 45-104.
22. 665 S.W.2d at 429.
23. Id. at 423-24; see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
24. Duncan applies to all cases tried after July 13, 1983, the date of the first Duncan
opinion. 665 S.W.2d at 434. The court in Dixon did not indicate when the trial occurred, but
it implicitly assumed that Duncan did not control the case.
25. Id. at 429.
26. A manufacturer might be required to warn about generally known risks as a reminder
in appropriate circumstances. Even if a product's risks are not generally known, a product
might not be defective if the manufacturer failed to warn about risks that the relevant group of
users would normally know. E.g., Blackwell Burner Co. v. Cedra, 644 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1982, writ refd n.r.e.) (failure to warn would not be producing cause if
user knew of dangers); Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Elec., 618 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (cannot evaluate warning adequacy apart from
knowledge of expected users).
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product defect, would not be a cause-in-fact of the injury under the "but for"
test. While a presumption exists in warnings cases that a user would have
read and heeded a warning,27 the presumption might not be applicable when
the user actually knew about the risks even without a warning. This argu-
ment should be couched as an issue of causation, not as an issue of defective-
ness under the "no duty" doctrine.
B. Unusual Accidents
Unusual results caused by a defendant's negligent conduct are analyzed
under the doctrines of duty and proximate causation. An injury that is suffi-
ciently unforeseeable is beyond the scope of liability, either because it is be-
yond the scope of the defendant's duty28 or because it is beyond the scope of
proximate causation. 29 Texas courts have not developed a similar doctrine
in strict tort liability. In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins30 the Texas
Supreme Court held that in strict tort liability a plaintiff must prove only
that the defect was a producing cause of his injuries, not that it was a proxi-
mate cause. Unlike proximate causation, producing causation does not de-
pend on a finding that the injury was foreseeable. 31
Without the doctrines of duty and proximate causation, Texas courts have
not developed a systematic approach to unusual accidents in strict tort liabil-
ity. Courts might rely on three separate doctrines. First, a court could rely
on the concept of defectiveness, finding that an accident is so unusual that
the risk of its occurrence is too small to render the product defective under
the risk-utility test. 32 Also under the rubric of defectiveness, a court might
conclude that an accident occurred under circumstances that the product
was not designed to encounter and hold that the product was not defective
for its normal use.33 Reliance on the concept of defectiveness has two diffi-
culties: it does not resolve cases in which the risk-utility test does not ap-
ply, 34 and it does not resolve cases in which a product is defective for one
type of risk but in which another type of injury occurs. Nevertheless, in
some cases the unusual nature of an accident may bear on the issue of defec-
tivenss under the risk-utility test.
27. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir. 1974); Technical
Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972); Blackwell Burner Co. v. Cedra, 644
S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rawlings Sporting Goods
Co. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) (seller may assume user read
and heeded warning).
28. E.g., Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. 1975) (finding that wet
floor just inside grocery store created no danger absolved store owner liability).
29. E.g., McClure v. Allied Stores of Texas, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. 1980) (evi-
dence sufficient to sustain jury finding that security guard proximately caused plaintiff's inju-
ries during pursuit of shoplifter).
30. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
31. Id. at 351.
32. See Turner, 584 S.W.2d at 847-48; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. See Fitzgerald Marine Sales v. LeUnes, 659 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, writ dism'd).
34. This problem is particularly evident in cases of manufacturing laws. See 3 STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.01 (1982).
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Second, a court could rely on the doctrine of misuse, concluding that the
unusual circumstances under which the accident occurred were not within
the product's normal use. This approach also creates difficulties, because
foreseeability of a product's use rather than the manufacturer's intent is the
normal test of misuse.3 5 A plaintiff may have used a product in a foreseeable
way but nevertheless be involved in a unusual accident.3 6 If the court re-
quired the accident to be foreseeable, it would both stretch the normal mean-
ing of misuse and violate the edict of Hopkins by incorporating the
equivalent of a proximate cause standard into strict tort liability. 37 More-
over, after Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 38 the doctrine of misuse has been
subsumed into the defense of contributory negligence. 39 Contributory negli-
gence may help in cases in which the plaintiff fails to use reasonable care, 40
but unusual accidents can occur without the plaintiff failing to use reason-
able care.
Third, a court could rely on the doctrine of producing causation. While
producing causation cannot include foreseeability and remain consistent
with Hopkins, foreseeability might be used to reflect other criteria to deter-
mine whether a specific injury should be compensable in strict tort liability.
The backbone of proximate causation in negligence is foreseeability because
it is a key ingredient in determining whether a defendant's conduct is negli-
gent in the first place. Except in cases involving warnings defects, foresee-
ability does not define defectivenss and therefore should not define
producing causation. But other factors that underlie the definition of defec-
tivenss could be used to determine whether an accident is so unrelated to the
product's defect that the policies underlying strict tort liability do not sup-
port recovery.
Some precedents concerning proximate causation in negligence reflect fac-
tors other than foreseeability. For example, a conclusion that rescuers are
within the scope of proximate causation reflects an approving attitude to-
ward rescuers as much as it does a judgment about the foreseeability of res-
cuers as intervening human causes. To rely on precedents concerning
proximate causation in negligence to help define producing causation in
strict tort liability would not be inconsistent with Hopkins to the extent that
those precedents rely on factors other than foreseeability.
Some consistent doctrine is clearly required in strict tort liability to re-
solve cases involving unusual accidents caused by defective products. An
automobile manufacter is not liable for a defective battery if a consumer,
after leaving his car at the dealer to have the battery repaired, decides to
browse in a book store next door and is injured when some books fall on
35. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 349.
36. See, e.g., Fitzgerald Marine Sales v. LeUnes, 659 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983, writ dism'd) (plaintiff using boat steering wheel as brace; when steering wheel
broke, plaintiff thrown from boat).
37. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 351.
38. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
39. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 351; see infra text accompanying notes 45-79.
40. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d at 351.
19851
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
him. The defective battery is a "but for" cause of the injury, and the con-
sumer neither was contributorily negligent nor misused the automobile-
even if misuse were still an independent defense. Producing cause seems to
be the best place to make a judgment about the scope of liability, keeping in
mind that it differs from proximate cause in negligence.
In Colvin v. Red Steel Co.4 1 the plaintiff sustained an injury when he fell at
a construction site. The plaintiff had grabbed a metal beam to support him-
self, but because the beam was shorter, and therefore lighter, than the speci-
fications required, it could not support him. The court declared that to
recover under strict tort liability the plaintiff must prove that at the time the
beam left the manufacturer it was unfit for its intended or reasonably fore-
seeable use. 42 The court held that the defendant could not have reasonably
foreseen such a use, implicitly holding that the product was not defective.43
The court's reliance on the absence of defectiveness raises problems. If
the divergence between the beam's actual length and its specified length had
caused a weakness in the building's structure, surely the court would have
held that the beam had a manufacturing flaw and was, therefore, defective.
A better rationale for a finding of no liability would have been to focus on
the unusual nature of the accident: even if the beam was defective, the acci-
dent was too unrelated to the reasons for calling it defective. This rationale
invokes the concept of producing causation. 44
C. Comparative Causation: Consumer Conduct Defenses and
Contribution
In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.45 the Texas Supreme Court adopted
comparative causation in strict tort liability cases. 46 The court held that a
plaintiff's negligence is a defense in a strict tort liability action when such
negligence is more than a mere failure to discover or guard against a product
defect.47 The court also held that while the Texas comparative negligence
41. 682 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1984).
42. Id. at 246.
43. Id.
44. The court's reliance on a product's foreseeable use raises issues concerning the contin-
uing vitality of the defense of product misuse. This issue, and Colvin's effect on it, is treated in
more detail in the discussion of Duncan, infra text accompanying notes 97-104.
45. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). The Supreme Court issued an earlier opinion in Duncan
on July 13, 1983. The Supreme Court withdrew that opinion and substituted the current opin-
ion on February 15, 1984. Although Duncan II was not decided during the period covered by
the 1984 Survey, I included a brief commentary on it, primarily because Duncan I had been
decided during the 1984 survey period. See Powers, Torts-Personal, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 1, 10 (1984). I have amplified that commentary here in order to present a
complete picture of the current survey period.
I am deeply indebted to my colleague, David Robertson, for much of the analysis in this
section. Discussions with him and his outstanding article, "Defenses Based on Plaintiffs Con-
duct and Related Issues after Duncan," prepared for the 1984 Products Liability and Personal
Injury Conference at The University of Texas Law School, were major sources of information
in preparing this section.
46. 665 S.W.2d at 427-28. The court also addressed the effect of a general release. See
Powers, supra note 45, at 33.
47. 665 S.W.2d at 432.
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statute48 does not directly apply to strict tort liability, a common law system
of comparative causation governs both the reduction of a plaintiff's recovery
and contribution among joint tortfeasors in suits based on strict tort
liability.49
Although the court had previously recognized the absolute defense of as-
sumption of risk and the comparative defense of unforeseeable misuse in
strict tort liability, it had declined to recognize contributory negligence as a
defense. 50 The Duncan court, noting the procedural complexities of these
three defenses in suits involving both strict tort liability and negligence,51
stated that assumed risk and unforeseeable misuse constitute extreme varia-
tions of contributory negligence.5 2 All three defenses focus in varying de-
grees on the reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct.53 Consequently, the
court recognized contributory negligence as a defense in strict tort liability
actions that reduces the plaintiff's recovery. 54 The court abolished assump-
tion of risk and unforeseeable misuse as independent defenses, subsuming
them into the comparative defense of contributory negligence." The
Duncan court also subsumed into the comparative defense of contributory
negligence the doctrines of avoidable consequences and mitigation of
damages.56
The court adopted a scheme of comparative causation to govern the re-
48. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1985).
49. 665 S.W.2d at 427-28.
50. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977) (de-
fense of unforeseeable misuse created in lieu of comparative negligence); Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975) (no defense that plaintiff did not inspect for open and obvious
defect); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Tex. 1974) (no defense that
plaintiff was negligent after discovering defect).
51. 665 S.W.2d at 423; see Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict-1979, 11
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 47-48 (1979) (noting procedural complexities in Texas comparative negli-
gence statute, art. 2212a).
52. 665 S.W.2d at 423.
53. Id. (citing Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 750-51 (Tex. 1980)
(Pope, J., concurring); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975)).
54. 665 S.W.2d at 428.
55. Id. The court overruled General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.
1977), and Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974), to the extent that they
conflict with Duncan. 665 S.W.2d at 428.
56. 665 S.W.2d at 428; see Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. 1974);
Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. 1973); Moulton v. Alamo
Ambulance Serv., 414 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. 1967).
Nothing in the rationale underlying strict tort liability is incompatible with contributory
negligence as a defense. See Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L.
REV. 777, 798-99 (1983). The irrelevance of the defendant's fault is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with the plaintiff's fault being an issue. Independent of our attitude toward manufactur-
ers, we may want to encourage consumers to be safe. Moreover, to spread losses attributable
to a plaintiff's fault among all the consumers of a product may be unfair. The historical reluc-
tance of courts to recognize contributory negligence as a defense in strict products liability
actions has largely been due to a dissatisfaction with the harsh, all-or-nothing consequences of
the defense. See Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability--Prelude to
Comparative Fault, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 729, 776-78 (1980) (advocating adoption of com-
parative fault); Special Project, Texas Tort Law in Transition, 57 TEX. L. REV. 381, 491-95
(1979) (noting procedural simplifications resulting from adoption of comparative fault princi-
ples). The advent of comparative principles has alleviated this problem.
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duction of a plaintiff's recovery and contribution among joint tortfeasors. 7
Although the Texas comparative negligence statute applies only to actions
for negligence, the court created a similar system of comparative causation
to govern strict tort liability. The court's comparative scheme involves allo-
cating a loss according to the parties' relative causation and is similar but
not identical to comparative negligence under article 2212a.5 8 The jury allo-
cates a percentage of causation to the plaintiff, to the products defendant,
and to other defendants, and the court structures an appropriate judgment.5 9
This new system governs the entirety of any action "in which at least one
defendant is found liable on a theory other than negligence." 6 °
The court's primary rationale for adopting comparative principles for
strict tort liability was to avoid the procedural labyrinth created by imposing
divergent schemes on negligence and strict tort liability actions, which com-
monly occur in the same lawsuit. 61 The court also reasoned that an all-or-
nothing approach to contribution was both unfair and inefficient because it
failed to apportion accident costs relative to the parties' abilities to prevent
those costs. 62 The court also noted that a growing number of other courts
have adopted comparative fault in strict tort liability actions. 63
57. 665 S.W.2d at 429.
58. In its first opinion, which was subsequently replaced by a second opinion, the court
adopted comparative fault. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 515-16. The court's second opinion, how-
ever, explicitly rejected comparative fault in favor of comparative causation. 665 S.W.2d at
427.
59. The court suggested the following jury submission:
If, in answer to Questions....,and__, you have found that more than one party's act(s) or
product(s) contributed to cause the plaintiff's injuries, and only in that event, then answer the
following question.





665 S.W.2d at 427 n.8.
60. Id. at 429.
61. Id. at 425.
62. Id. at 424-25. The unfairness of an all-or-nothing approach is understandable. Its
inefficiency, however, is debatable. Efficiency depends on the incentives facing actors when
they engage in an activity. The aggregate likelihood of liability governs these incentives, which
may reflect proportionate ability to reduce accidents even if individual cases are governed by
an all-or-nothing or pro rata approach. A total rejection of contributory negligence is theoreti-
cally inefficient because it removes the consumer's pecuniary interest in safety, but contribu-
tory negligence as an all-or-nothing defense is not necessarily inefficient. Indeed, comparative
negligence is theoretically inefficient. Fairness is a more powerful argument than allocative
efficiency for comparative principles in individual cases.
63. Id. at 426; see Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1427-28 (5th Cir. 1983) (admiralty
jurisdiction); Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 1979) (Virgin Islands);
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir.
1977) (admiralty jurisdiction); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp.
1093, 1098 (D. Mont. 1981), affTd, 701 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1983); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 890 (Alaska 1979); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.,
555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1976); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d
441, 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d
1162, 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla.
[Vol. 39
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Although the system of comparative causation adopted in Duncan is simi-
lar to corihparative negligence, it differs from comparative negligence in sev-
eral important respects. These differences may create problems for courts
submitting a case involving both negligence and strict tort liability to the
jury. Duncan applies to all defendants, whether negligent or strictly liable,
in a case in which the jury finds at least one defendant liable under strict tort
liability or breach of warranty. 64 If the jury does not find at least one de-
fendant liable under a theory other than negligence, article 2212a, 65 the
Texas comparative negligence statute, continues to be applicable. 66 Since
the jury verdict will not be known at the time the case is submitted to the
jury, trial courts will face a difficult problem determining the appropriate
method for submitting the case to the jury.
The first difference between Duncan and article 2212a is that under
Duncan the jury must compare causation rather than negligence or fault, as
is appropriate under article 2212a. The trial judge might instruct the jury
that in allocating percentages for the various parties, it should compare cau-
sation if it finds at least one defendant liable under strict tort liability or
breach of warranty, but otherwise that it should compare negligence. This
approach seems unduly complicated, however. Since jurors are not likely to
distinguish greatly between causation and fault, a preferable approach would
be to instruct the jury to compare causation and let the comparison stand,
even if it turns out that article 2212a rather than Duncan applies.
Even if this problem involving the jury instruction is resolved, a scheme
based on comparative causation is likely to create other problems because it
combines two separate steps in allocating a loss among defendants. Aside
from comparative principles, a defendant is appropriately held liable only for
damages that he causes. Consider a driver who is injured in a collision with
another negligent motorist in which (1) the original impact causes injuries to
his back; (2) a defective steering wheel shatters in his hand; and (3) a doctor
treating him for the injured hand negligently administers a drug that causes
a rash. The negligent driver is a cause-in-fact of all the plaintiffs injuries
under the "but for" test of causation. The steering wheel manufacturer,
however, is a cause-in-fact only of the hand injury and the rash, whereas the
1976); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Hawaii 447, 654 P.2d 343, 354 (1982); Sandford v.
Chevrolet Div. of General Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624, 628 (1982); Star Furniture Co.
v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 862-63 (W. Va. 1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d
443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
An obstacle to adopting comparative principles in strict tort liability has been a fear that
comparing one party's fault with the culpability of a strict tort liability defendant who has not
been at fault is theoretically impossible. Just as we often compare seemingly incommensurate
interests while making personal or social decisions, however, we can compare the culpability of
various defendants if the judgments concerning each actor are based on different underlying
values. The Duncan court implicitly recognized this by concluding that the jury can compare
various versions of fault, including negligence, selling a defective product, and breaching an
implied or express warranty. 665 S.W.2d at 427. The court's holding may also suggest that
strict tort liability is not that different from negligence. See Powers, supra note 56, at 802-05.
64. 665 S.W.2d at 429.
65. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1985).
66. 665 S.W.2d at 427.
1985]
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doctor is a cause-in-fact only of the rash. The plaintiff, of course, is a cause-
in-fact of all three injuries. Since only the negligent driver caused the back
injury, he alone should be liable for it. Since the negligent driver and the
steering wheel manufacturer caused the hand injury, the hand injury should
be allocated between them, and the plaintiff when appropriate, according to
the comparative allocation principles of Duncan. The rash, caused jointly by
all three defendants, should be allocated among all of them according to the
allocation principles of Duncan.
Using comparative causation to allocate the rash creates two problems.
First, if comparative causation means cause-in-fact, the rash cannot be allo-
cated because each defendant was a cause-in-fact of the entire rash.67 Sec-
ond, if comparative causation refers to some other allocative principle, using
the word "causation" is likely to confuse the jury, since the allocation princi-
ple differs from the cause-in-fact principle that protects the doctor from lia-
bility for the back and hand injuries altogether. 68  By using the term
"causation" the court creates the risk that these separate allocative princi-
ples will be merged into one. 69
The second difference between Duncan and article 2212a is that unlike
article 2212a, Duncan adopted pure, rather than modified, comparative prin-
ciples. 70 Consequently, if the jury assigns fifty-one percent causation to the
plaintiff, his injury is reduced by fifty-one percent rather than barred alto-
gether. This difference will not cause problems for submitting a case to the
jury because the trial court can wait for the verdict to determine whether the
judgment should be structured according to Duncan or according to article
2212a.
The third difference is that each defendant is jointly and severally liable
under Duncan even if the jury assigns him a lower percentage of causation
67. Proximate causation has its own difficulties as a method of allocation since a different
standard governs proximate causation in negligence than governs producing causation in strict
tort liability. See General Motors v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 nn.3-4 (Tex. 1977).
68. For the jury accurately to allocate damages it must first decide who caused which
portions of the injury. For example, the driver alone caused the back injury; the driver and the
steering wheel manufacturer caused the hand injury; and the driver, steering wheel manufac-
turer, and doctor caused the rash. Then the jury must allocate percentages within each cate-
gory. This should not be done in one submission because the jury may want to allocate a high
percentage of the rash to the doctor as well as a high percentage of the hand injury to the
steering wheel manufacturer.
69. Faith that the jury will separate these tasks in a single submission is naive. If damages
due to the rash are $1000, damages due to the hand are $5000, and damages due to the back
are $25,000, a single submission could easily lead the jury to allocate 10% to the doctor, 30%
to the steering wheel manufacturer, and 60% to the negligent driver. The evidence would not
support the resulting judgment of $3100 against the doctor, unless the court was willing to
abandon the principle that defendants are liable only for damages they have in fact caused.
Cases in which a jury cannot determine which defendant caused which portions of the harm
present a different, more complicated issue. See, e.g., Loui v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.2d
393, 395 (1968) (plaintiff injured same area of body in four separate automobile accidents over
four years); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(plaintiffs could not trace cancer-causing drug, prescribed by doctors generically rather than
by brand name, to any one of several manufacturers who had mutually agreed to use same
drug formula), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
70. 665 S.W.2d at 429.
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than the plaintiff.71 Under article 2212a, section 2(c), a negligent defendant
is jointly and severally liable unless he is less negligent than the plaintiff, in
which case he is liable only for his own percentage of fault.72 Since the trial
court can wait for the verdict to determine whether Duncan or article 2212a
applies and then structure the judgment, this difference does not create
problems for submitting a case to the jury.
Fourth, under Duncan a partial settlement between the plaintiff and one
defendant reduces the plaintiff's claim against the other defendants by the
percentage loss the jury allocated to the settling defendant. 73 If the plaintiff
makes an advantageous settlement, the plaintiff may recover more than the
entire amount of the damages, notwithstanding the one-recovery rule of
Bradshaw v. Baylor University.74 Unlike article 2212a, section 2(d), 75 under
Duncan no dollar-for-dollar credit will be given if the settling tortfeasor's
percentage causation is not submitted to the jury. Again, on this issue the
trial court can wait for the verdict and structure the judgment according to
Duncan or article 2212a, depending on which is applicable.
A fifth and more problematic distinction is that different conduct by the
plaintiff constitutes contributory negligence under Duncan than under arti-
cle 2212a. On one hand, a mere negligent failure to discover or guard
against a product defect does not count as contributory negligence under
Duncan76 but presumably does count under article 2212a.77 On the other
hand, Duncan explicitly stated that a plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages
and the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which might not be a part of a
percentage finding of contributory negligence under article 2212a, are sub-
sumed into contributory negligence. 78 These differences in what constitutes
71. Thus, an insolvent tortfeasor's share of the loss is allocated to the other defendants
under Duncan, regardless of the relative percentages allotted to the plaintiff and the other
defendants. Id.
72. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section 2(c)
provides that:
Each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the
judgment awarded the claimant, except that a defendant whose negligence is less
than that of the claimant is liable to the claimant only for that portion of the
judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to him.
73. 665 S.W.2d at 429.
74. 126 Tex. 99, 104, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935, opinion adopted),
overruled by Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (Tex. 1984).
75. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section 2(d)
provides that:
If an alleged joint tort-feasor pays an amount to a claimant in settlement, but
is never joined as a party defendant, or having been joined, is dismissed or non-
suited after settlement with the claimant (for which reason the existence and
amount of his negligence are not submitted to the jury), each defendant is enti-
tled to deduct from the amount for which he is liable to the claimant a percent-
age of the amount of the settlement based on the relationship the defendant's
own negligence bears to the total negligence of all defendants.
Id.
76. 665 S.W.2d at 432.
77. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
78. 665 S.W.2d at 423; see supra text accompanying note 56. Mitigation of damages refers
to plaintiffs conduct after an accident that proximately caused some of his injuries, such as
failure to heed his doctor's advice. Avoidable consequences refers to plaintiff's conduct before
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contributory negligence will create problems when submitting a case to the
jury because the trial court must determine prior to the submission-and,
therefore, prior to learning whether Duncan or article 2212a governs the
case-whether to include these various forms of contributory negligence.
One solution might be to ask the jury to allocate percentages to each type
of plaintiff conduct and then have the trial court ignore the irrelevant types
when structuring the judgment. This method, however, may give the jury
too many opportunities to allocate percentages to the plaintiff. To mitigate
this problem the jury could be asked to assign one aggregate percentage for
the plaintiff, and then state which portions of that aggregate were due to the
separate types of plaintiff conduct. In either case the trial court could struc-
ture the judgment, using only the relevant percentages. Under both methods
the relevant total may not add up to 100%, but the trial court could allocate
liability according to the ratios of the percentages that turn out to be
relevant. 79
Other issues remain unresolved after Duncan. For example, Duncan left
unclear whether the set-off provision of article 2212a, section 2(0,80 also ap-
plies to cases governed by Duncan. Some Texas courts have held that, in
negligence cases, set-off is automatic and required by Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure 301 and 302.81 Although this conclusion may itself be dubious, it
would seem to apply to cases governed by Duncan, since it is independent of
the language in article 2212a, section 2(f).
Whether the conduct of non-settling persons who have not been made
parties to the lawsuit should be submitted to the jury for a percentage finding
also remains uncertain after Duncan. In Varela v. American Petrofina Co. 8 2
the Texas Supreme Court held that under article 2212a the negligence of the
plaintiff's employer should not be submitted to the jury to reduce the plain-
tiff's recovery from other tortfeasors. 83 Arguably, Varela does not apply to
an accident, such as failing to wear seat belts, which was not a proximate cause of the accident
but was a proximate cause of some of his injuries. Before adoption of comparative negligence,
avoidable consequences had no effect on the plaintiff's recovery. Mitigation of damages was
not a form of contributory negligence that would bar the plaintiff's recovery altogether, but the
defendant was entitled to an instruction that the jury should reduce the plaintiff's damages by
the amount of injury the failure to mitigate damages caused. After the adoption of compara-
tive negligence in article 2212a, the status of these doctrines is unclear. Possibly they are still
not part of the percentage finding of contributory negligence. See Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516
S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. 1974); Kerby v. Abilene Christian College, 503 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex.
1973); Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Serv., 414 S.W.2d 444, 447-48 (Tex. 1967); Whitman v.
Campbell, 618 S.W.2d 935, 937-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ); Armellini Ex-
press Lines of Florida, Inc. v. Ansley, 605 S.W.2d 297, 304, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PAT-rERN JURY CHARGES PJC
80.17 (1982).
79. See Haney Elec. Co. v. Hurst, 624 S.W.2d 602, 611-13 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, writ
dism'd).
80. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(0 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
81. TEX. R. Civ. P. 301, 302; see Building Concepts, Inc. v. Duncan, 667 S.W.2d 897, 904
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Willingham v. Hagerty, 553 S.W.2d
137, 139-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
82. 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983); see Powers, supra note 45, at 21-24 (discussing holding
and impact of Varela).
83. 658 S.W.2d at 561-62.
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cases governed by Duncan, because Varela relied heavily on the language of
article 2212a. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Boyett8 4 the court stated in dic-
tum that, after Duncan, the negligence of non-settling non-parties should be
submitted to the jury.85 Nevertheless, the supreme court declining to follow
Varela in a case governed by Duncan would be surprising.
A related issue seemingly resolved after Duncan is whether a settling
tortfeasor must be made a party to the litigation in order to have his percent-
age of negligence submitted to the jury. In Acord v. General Motors Corp. 8 6
the Texas Supreme Court held that in a products liability case a settling
defendant's negligence should be submitted to the jury even if he had not
been made a party.8 7 This holding will likely apply to cases governed by
article 2212a as well.
The issues Duncan creates concerning submitting a hybrid negligence-
strict liability case to the jury result from the divergence between the system
adopted in Duncan and the system embodied in article 2212a. These issues
will not be fully resolved until one system governs both negligence and strict
liability. In addition to the issues that Duncan raises concerning the
mechanics of jury submission and the operation of its comparative scheme,
Duncan raises some questions about the substantive contours of assumption
of the risk and unforeseeable misuse as defenses in strict liability cases.88 In
Farley v. M M Cattle Co.89 the Texas Supreme Court required that in negli-
gence cases a risk be unreasonable to trigger the defense of assumption of a
risk.90 Before its decision in Farley, the Texas Supreme Court in Henderson
v. Ford Motor Co. 91 had declined to adopt the unreasonable risk requirement
for assumption of risk in strict tort liability.92 In Duncan the court sug-
gested that the defendant must now prove that a risk is unreasonable in or-
der to trigger assumption of risk as a defense in a strict tort liability. 93 Since
84. 674 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
85. Id. at 789.
86. 669 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984).
87. Id. at 117.
88. Before Duncan Texas courts recognized assumption of the risk as a defense in strict
tort liability. See Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. 1967);
Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Hill-
man-Kelley v. Pittman, 489 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no writ); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1977). Establishing the defense of
assumption of the risk required a defendant to prove that the plaintiff had actual, subjective
knowledge and appreciation of the risk, see Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975);
Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. 1967); and that plaintiff volunta-
rily exposed himself to the risk, see Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hillman-Kelly v. Pittman, 489 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1972, no writ).
89. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
90. Id. at 758; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1977); see
also Parker v. Highlands Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. 1978) (abolishing "no duty"
doctrine); Rosas v. Buddies Food Stores, 518 S.W.2d 534, 537-39 (Tex. 1975) (abolishing doc-
trine of volenti non fit injuria).
91. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
92. Id. at 91. "[A] plaintiff may have elected from some alternatives to face the danger
without being barred from subsequent recovery, but it does not mean that a fact issue of rea-
sonableness is always an element of the defense." Id.
93. 665 S.W.2d at 423. The Duncan court explained:
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assumption of risk now apparently depends on the unreasonableness of the
risk, the doctrine has been subsumed into contributory negligence. 94
One possible exception to the conflation of assumption of risk and contrib-
utory negligence may be the plaintiff's mere failure to discover the product
defect. This type of contributory negligence is not a defense in strict tort
liability under Duncan,9 5 but the plaintiff's actual knowledge of a defect
would presumably still trigger the defense of assumption of risk. In such a
case it would be important to determine whether assumption of risk applies
only to unreasonable risks, as now seems to be the requirement after
Duncan. If assumption of risk continues to have independent vitality in this
situation, it would presumably only reduce the plaintiffs recovery under
comparative causation rather than bar recovery altogether. 96
In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins97 the Texas Supreme Court held that
unforeseeable product misuse 98 that proximately causes9 9 a plaintiff's injury
reduces his recovery according to a scheme of comparative causation.I°° In
Duncan the court seemed to abandon unforeseeable product misuse as an
independent defense by subsuming it into contributory negligence, 101 but the
court did not focus on the specific problem of unforeseeable uses as distin-
guished from unreasonable uses.' 0 2 This problem was implicitly addressed
in Colvin v. Red Steel Co. 103 The Colvin court held that a plaintiff must
prove "that the product was not fit for its intended or reasonably foreseeable
use at the time it left the manufacturer"'104 in order to recover under strict
tort liability. Without expressly analyzing the defense of product misuse, the
If there was any qualitative difference between contributory negligence, on the
one hand, and assumed risk and misuse, on the other, this procedural complex-
ity might be justified. Assumed risk and unforeseeable misuse, however, are
nothing more than extreme variants of contributory negligence. To varying de-
grees, all three defenses focus on the reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 428; see supra text accompanying note 56.
95. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
96. 665 S.W.2d at 429.
97. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); see also McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 370
(5th Cir. 1968) (misuse does not constitute defense to strict liability suit in Texas); Rourke v.
Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1975) (strict liability does not apply in cases of misuse); Heil
Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (supplier not
liable for injuries resulting from misuse); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d
773, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ dism'd) (manufacturer not liable for knowing
violation of printed warning on product).
98. The Hopkins court stated: "Misuse in this application has been defined by the Oregon
Supreme Court as 'a use or handling so unusual that the average consumer could not reason-
ably expect the product to be designed and manufactured to withstand it-a use which the
seller, therefore, need not anticipate and provide for.' " 548 S.W.2d at 349 (citing Findlay v.
Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 509 P.2d 28, 31 (1973)).
99. While a plaintiff must prove only that a product defect was a "producing cause" of his
injuries, the defendant must prove that a product misuse was a "proximate cause" of the plain-
tiff's injuries. See supra note 67.
100. 548 S.W.2d at 352.
101. 665 S.W.2d at 423; see supra text accompanying note 55.
102. In Hopkins product misuse depended upon the unforeseeability of the use. 548
S.W.2d at 351.
103. 682 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1984).
104. Id. at 246.
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court seems to have converted unforeseeable use, which was the comparative
defense of misuse in Hopkins and was subsumed into contributory negligence
in Duncan, into an element of defectiveness. In light of these conflicting
formulations the role of unforeseeable product uses in strict tort liability re-
mains unclear.
D. Special Transactions: Sales-Service Distinction
Several Texas cases address the applicability of strict tort liability or im-
plied warranty of merchantability to service transactions and to hybrid sales-
service transactions.°10 The cases do not, however, develop a comprehensive
analysis of the product-service distinction other than to conclude that pure
services are governed by neither strict tort liability nor an implied warranty
of merchantability. 0 6 In Gray v. Enserch, Inc. 107 the Fort Worth court of
appeals, adding to this line of cases, held that strict tort liability did not
govern a gas explosion in the plaintiff's home caused by the defendant's fail-
ure to repair a leak in a gas main. 08 The court concluded that the defendant
had not delivered a defective product, but the court did not suggest a com-
prehensive test to determine what constitutes a product and what does
not. 1o9
105. See G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982) (construction and
sale of house not governed by U.C.C.); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968)
(optometrist not strictly liable for improperly fitted contact lenses); Navauex v. Park Place
Hosp., 656 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (radiation therapy
administered by hospital not governed by strict tort liability); Navarro County Elec. Coop. v.
Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ) (implied warranty of
merchantability not applicable to transmission of electricity); Thomas v. Saint Joseph Hosp.,
618 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hospital
may be held strictly liable to patient supplied with flammable gown); Providence Hosp. v.
Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 131-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd) (hospital liable
under implied warranty of merchantability for contaminated drug); Langford v. Kraft, 551
S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977) (stating in dictum that strict liability is not
applicable to services), afid, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978); Moody v. City of Galveston, 524
S.W.2d 583, 588-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (contami-
nated water supply governed by strict liability); Ethicon v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (doctor not strictly liable for defective needle
used during operation); Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (strict liability inapplicable to transmission of
electricity); City of Denton v. Gray, 501 S.W.2d 151, 153-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (strict liability not applicable to flooding caused by supplier of water);
Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (hospital not liable under warranty theory or strict tort liability for contaminated
drug); see also Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir. 1972) (hospi-
tal not strictly liable for injuries caused by defective needle); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 666 (5th Cir. 1971) (feed supplement seller not strictly liable for
defect that is not unreasonably dangerous).
106. See generally Powers, Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability,
62 N.C.L. REV. 415, 415-16 (1984) (examining how products and services are to be
distinguished).
107. 665 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
108. Id. at 605. The court also held that the defendant was not liable under common law
strict liability based on an abnormally dangerous activity. Id. at 606.
109. The Texas Supreme Court will have an opportunity to clarify the law in this area




A. Jurisdiction of Statutory Probate Courts over Wrongful Death and
Survival Claims
In Seay v. Hall' 10 the Texas Supreme Court held that statutory probate
courts do not have jurisdiction over a survival claim or a wrongful death
claim brought on behalf of a decedent's estate or his dependents. 11' The
court reasoned that neither action primarily concerned estates or the settle-
ment of estates under section 5A(b) of the Probate Code, 112 which estab-
lished jurisdiction of the probate court.1 3 Moreover, because neither action
is for a liquidated claim, neither constitutes a claim by an estate under sec-
tion 5A(b). 114
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ granted) (patient brought suit against psychiatrist for breach
of implied warranty).
Two other cases involving strict tort liability should be noted briefly. In Jampole v. Touchy,
673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984), the Texas Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling
discovery of alternative product designs that the defendant had prepared. The court's discus-
sion of the relevancy of these designs reiterates some of the factors that are important in deter-
mining whether a product is defective under the risk-utility test. Id. at 573-75. In Sowders v.
M.W. Kellogg Co., 663 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the court upheld the 10-year statute of limitations applicable to architects, engineers,
and contractors, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1985), against attacks
that: (1) it violated the title requirement of the Texas Constitution, (2) it violated the open
courts and due process guarantees of the Texas and United States Constitutions, and (3) it
violated the equal protection clauses of the Texas and United States Constitutions. The Texas
Supreme Court held, however, in Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984), that the
legislature's attempt to abrogate the discovery rule in the medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. See infra notes 138-47 and
accompanying text.
The Fifth Circuit also decided several cases interpreting Texas products liability law. In
Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984), the court held that
Texas law does not preclude repeated awards of punitive damages against the same defendant
in successive suits by different plaintiffs. Id. at 1041. The court also held that under Texas law
the jury should not be instructed that personal injury damage awards are not subject to federal
income taxation. Id. at 1045; see Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 291
S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956). In Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984),
the court held that a parent corporation was not liable for a defective product sold by its
wholly-owned subsidiary even though the subsidiary mislabeled the product as having been
manufactured by the parent. Id. at 1091.
The Fifth Circuit decided three products liability cases involving the discovery rule under
Texas's two-year statute of limitations. The Texas discovery rule provides that certain inher-
ently undiscoverable causes of action do not accrue until the plaintiff learns or reasonably
should have learned of the negligent cause. In Timberlake v. A.H. Robbins Co., 727 F.2d 1363
(5th Cir. 1984), the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until she had, or should have, discovered the injury, its causal connection with the
defendant, and the defendant's wrongdoing. Id. at 1365. The court held that under Texas's
discovery rule, discovery of injury and a causal connection to the defendant sufficed to start the
statute of limitations running. Id. at 1365-66; see Woodruff v. A.H. Robbins Co., 742 F.2d
228, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1984); Mann v. A.H. Robbins Co., 741 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1984) (both
applying discovery rule to specific facts).
110. 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984).
111. Id. at 25.
112. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN § 5A(b) (Vernon 1980).
113. 677 S.W.2d at 23.
114. Id. at 23-24. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon 1980) states: "In proceedings
in the statutory probate courts and district courts, the phrases 'appertaining to estates' and
'incident to an estate' in this Code include . . . but are not limited to, all claims by or against
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Tort claims against an estate present a different issue that might be re-
solved in favor of jurisdiction in the probate court. In Adams v. Calloway'15
the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that a tort action against an estate
does fall within the jurisdiction of the statutory probate court." 6 The court
of appeals, however, decided Adams before the Seay decision. Although
Seay does not directly address actions against estates, it does cast doubt on
the court's reasoning in Adams.
The Adams court relied on a Texas Supreme Court holding that an action
for conversion brought by the executor of an estate falls within the jurisdic-
tion of the probate court." 7 A claim for conversion may be liquidated, how-
ever; in Seay the supreme court held that a personal injury claim does not
qualify as a claim under section 5A(b) of the Probate Code precisely because
it is not liquidated.' 18 The Adams court reasoned that if tort claims brought
on behalf of or by the estate can be considered incident to the estate, then
other tort claims against the estate can also be considered as incident to the
estate under the section 5A(b) definition." 1 9 In this regard the Adams court
relied heavily on the court of appeals' opinion in Seay.' 20 Of course, the
supreme court's reversal of the court of appeals' decision in Seay renders this
reasoning invalid.
B. Non-Pecuniary Damages for Wrongful Death
In Sanchez v. Schindler'2' the Texas Supreme Court held that parents can
recover for mental anguish and loss of consortium for the wrongful death of
a minor child.122 This year the interpretation of Sanchez spawned a great
deal of litigation in the courts of appeals. The first issue involves the precise
elements of recoverable damages. In three cases courts of appeals held that
loss of consortium and mental anguish are separate and recoverable elements
of damage.' 23 The Houston court of appeals held, however, that a separate
award to a parent for medical expenses and lost earnings due to mental
anguish was inappropriate. 24 This holding was surprising because actual,
out-of-pocket losses seem to be a worthier reason for recovery than the in-
tangible elements of mental anguish and loss of consortium.
an estate .. " Cf English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675-76 (Tex. 1979) (conversion claim
held to be within county court's probate jurisdiction).
115. 662 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
116. Id. at 426-27.
117. Id. at 426 (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979)).
118. 677 S.W.2d at 23.
119. 662 S.W.2d at 426 (citing Seay v. Hall, 663 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983),
rev'd, 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984)).
120. 663 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983), rev'di 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984).
121. 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
122. Id. at 252-53.
123. See Moore v. Lillebo, 674 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ granted);
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Dawson, 662 S.W.2d 740, 742-43 (rex. App-Corpus Christi 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gulf States Util. Co. v. Reed, 659 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Reed, 659 S.W.2d 849, 852-53 (rex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The second issue raised by Sanchez concerns the application of the
Sanchez ruling to cases involving the death of parents and adult children.
Courts of appeals held that one spouse can recover for loss of consortium
and mental anguish caused by the wrongful death of the other spouse, 125 and
that a parent can recover for loss of consortium and mental anguish caused
by the wrongful death of an adult child. 126 Furthermore, the Houston court
of appeals held in Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc. 127 that children
can recover for loss of consortium and mental anguish caused by the wrong-
ful death of a parent. 128 The Fort Worth court of appeals, however, denied
recovery for loss of consortium under the Wrongful Death Act to the
spouses and children of passengers who were killed in an airplane crash. 129
Plausible arguments can be made that Sanchez should be applied only to
the death of minor children and that the decision should cover a broader
range of family members, including parents and spouses. The Sanchez court
itself reasoned that a parent's recovery for the loss of a child's companion-
ship is closely analogous to a spouse's recovery for loss of consortium when
the other spouse has been negligently injured.130 If the loss of companion-
ship caused by a child's death is analogous to loss of consortium caused by a
spouse's injury, then loss of companionship caused by a spouse's death, if not
a parent's death, is an even closer analogy. Justices Ray and Kilgarlin stated
in Sanchez that they would expand recovery to cover the death of a
spouse. 131
Courts arguably should not read Sanchez to authorize recovery for loss of
consortium and mental anguish in cases not involving the death of a child.
Expanded liability rules tend to increase insurance premiums, and the inclu-
sion of a specific type of injury in damage awards effectively requires that we
insure against it. Risks that are evenly spread throughout society might
plausibly be taken as risks rather than be included in personal injury awards
and thereby be included in a judicially imposed insurance scheme. Insuring
against some risks but not others may be desirable. Since most people volun-
tarily tend to insure against out-of-pocket pecuniary losses, but not against
emotional loss, a court might validly distinguish pecuniary loss and emo-
tional loss in determining recoverable damages.
125. Monsanto Co. v. Johnson, 675 S.W.2d 305, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ); see Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Dawson, 662 S.W.2d 740, 742-43 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Houston v. Stoddard, 675 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984,
writ refd n.r.e.); Moore v. Lillebo, 674 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ
granted); Lavender v. Hofer, 658 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
127. 678 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ granted) (court stating
in dictum that every class of beneficiary under Wrongful Death Act can recover damages for
loss of consortium and mental anguish).
128. Id. at 553.
129. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 674 S.W.2d 447, 462 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984,
writ granted). The court also held that loss of inheritance is a special damage that must be
specially pleaded and proved. Whether loss of inheritance should be awarded depends upon
the circumstances of the specific case. Id. at 454.
130. 651 S.W.2d at 252; see Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978).
131. 651 S.W.2d at 258.
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Cases involving a child's death are special, however, because the defend-
ant would often escape liability altogether if damages for mental anguish
were not recoverable. 132 In cases involving the death of a spouse or parent
the defendant is normally liable for substantial pecuniary damages even if
loss of consortium and mental anguish are not recoverable. Consequently,
to award nonpecuniary damages in cases involving the death of a child
would be reasonable, notwithstanding a general rejection of nonpecuniary
damages under the Wrongful Death Act. 133
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. Limitation on Damages
Section 11.02 of the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act of 1977 imposes a $500,000 limitation on the civil liability of a physician
or other health care provider. 134 In Baptist Hospital of Southeast Texas, Inc.
v. Baber135 the Beaumont court of appeals held that this limitation, as ap-
plied to hospitals, is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection
clause. 136 The court reasoned that, while the United States Supreme Court
has not expressly required that statutes that disadvantage a specific group
also give that group a quid pro quo benefit, many other courts have relied on
this factor when analyzing statutes under the equal protection clause.
137
Since the court could ascertain no such quid pro quo for persons injured by
hospitals, it held that the statute violated the equal protection clause.' 38
B. Statute of Limitations
In 1975 the Texas Legislature enacted a special two-year statute of limita-
tions for medical malpractice claims against health care providers who carry
professional liability insurance.139 The 1975 legislation was replaced in 1977
by the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act,140 which applies
to all health care providers, regardless of whether they are covered by pro-
132. This result would not have been the case in Sanchez because the defendant was liable
for substantial damages under the survival statute for the decedent's medical care and pain and
suffering. 651 S.W.2d at 250.
133. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon 1952). This issue is likely to be re-
solved soon because the Texas Supreme Court granted an application for writ of error in Cav-
nar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ granted).
134. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(i), § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
135. 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ granted).
136. Id. at 298.
137. Id. (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660
P.2d 829, 837, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983);Wright v. Central Div. Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d
313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742-43 (1976); Carson v. Mauer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 837
(1980); Arneson v. Olsen, 280 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medi-
cal Center, 355 N.E.2d 903, 909-10 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1976).
138. 672 S.W.2d at 298. The court did not consider potentially lower hospital rates.
139. Act of June 3, 1975, ch. 330, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 865-66, repealed by
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of 1977, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2039, 2064.
140. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(i), § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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fessional liability insurance. The 1977 legislation is codified in article
4590(i), section 10.01, of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, and provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be
commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occur-
rence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care
treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for
which the claim is made is completed .... 141
Both statutes purport to abrogate the "discovery rule," under which a stat-
ute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or by exer-
cising reasonable care should know, about the injury. Consequently, both
statutes attempt to bar actions that a reasonably diligent plaintiff could not
have discovered. 142
In Nelson v. Krusen 143 the Texas Supreme Court held that, insofar as it
abrogated the discovery rule, the 1975 version of the statute of limitations
violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. 144 Nelson did
not directly address the 1977 version of the statute of limitations because the
conduct in Nelson occurred before the effective date of the 1977 legislation,
but the court's reasoning seems also to apply to the current statute. 145
In Borderlon v. Peck 146 the Texas Supreme Court held that while article
4590(i), section 10.01, purports to abrogate the discovery rule, it does not
abolish fraudulent concealment as an equitable estoppel to the defense of
limitations. 147  Of course, if the Texas Supreme Court follows Nelson v.
Krusen and strikes down the abrogation of the discovery rule in article
4590(i), section 10.01, the decision in Borderlon is inconsequential. The
supreme court in Borderlon was not required to decide whether article
4590(i), section 10.01, was constitutional.148
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Tex. 1983); Stephens v. James,
673 S.W.2d 299, 301-02 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Morrison v. Chan, 668
S.W.2d 483, 484-85 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Atha v. Polsky, 667
S.W.2d 307, 308-11 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Phillips v. Sharpstown Gen.
Hosp., 664 S.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, no writ).
143. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
144. Id. at 921; see TEX. CONST. art 1, § 13 (every person has a right to a remedy by due
course of law for an injury to him, his lands, his goods, or his reputation).
145. In Neagle v. Nelson, 658 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd,
28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 215 (Jan. 30, 1985) the Corpus Christi court of appeals upheld article
4590(i), section 10.01, against attacks based on the open courts provision of the Texas Consti-
tution and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Texas and United States Consti-
tutions. Neagle was decided before Krusen and Judge (now Justice) Gonzales dissented. The
Texas Supreme Court reversed the Neagle decision and applied Krusen to article 4590(i), sec-
tion 10.01.
In Morrison v. Chan, 668 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
and Phillips v. Sharpstown Gen. Hosp., 664 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1983, no writ), both decided before Krusen, the courts upheld article 4590(i), section 10.01,
against various constitutional attacks.
146. 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983).
147. Id. at 908-09.
148. In Stephens v. James, 673 S.W.2d 299, 301-02 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd
n.r.e.), the Dallas court of appeals held that although article 5.82 of the Insurance Code was
intended to abrogate the discovery rule and not the fraudulent concealment doctrine, the stat-
ute begins to run from the date that the plaintiff is made aware of facts that would cause a
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Three other cases addressed technical issues concerning calculation of the
two-year statute of limitations. In Atha v. Polsky149 the Austin court of ap-
peals held that the two-year limitation period of the repealed 1975 legisla-
tion 5° was not tolled for the entire time a patient maintained a medical
relationship with the doctor if that relationship was not associated with the
treatment out of which the claim arose.15' In Hill v. Milani 52 the Austin
court of appeals held that the temporary absence tolling provision that nor-
mally tolls a statute of limitations when a defendant is absent from the state
is not applicable to the two-year statute of limitations in article 4590(i), sec-
tion 10.01.153 Arguably, if Nelson v. Krusen is applied to article 4590(i),
section 10.01, to restore the discovery rule, the temporary absence tolling
provision will be as applicable to article 4590(i), section 10.01, as it is to any
other statute of limitations. Article 4590(i), section 10.01, is special only
because of its absolute nature. This feature would no longer be present if its
abrogation of the discovery rule were ruled unconstitutional. Conversely, a
defendant might argue that Hill was based on statutory construction and
that the meaning of article 4590(i), section 10.01, would not be changed by a
holding that one of its features is unconstitutional. In Valdez v. Texas Chil-
dren's Hospital'54 the Houston court of appeals held that article 4590(i), sec-
tion 10.01, does not abrogate the provision that tolls the statute of
limitations for one year following the death of the person in whose favor the
action could be brought.' 55
C. Wrongful Life
In Nelson v. Krusen156 the Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize a
cause of action for wrongful life. 157 The plaintiff was born with Duschenne
Muscular Dystrophy and his parents claimed that he would not have been
born if the physician had informed them of the child's illness before birth.
The physician was not responsible for the defect itself. The child sued to
recover general damages attributed to the pain and suffering of muscular
dystrophy and special damages for the added medical expenses necessary to
treat his impaired condition. ' 58 The court refused to recognize such cause of
action because it would have implicated philosophical and moral positions
reasonable person to make an inquiry that, if pursued, would lead to discovery of the con-
cealed cause of action.
149. 667 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
150. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (Vernon 1975) (repealed).
151. 677 S.W.2d at 308-11.
152. 678 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984), aft'd, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 300 (Mar. 13,
1985).
153. 678 S.W.2d at 204-05; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5537 (Vernon 1958).
154. 673 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
155. Id. at 344; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5538 (Vernon 1958). The court also
held that the child's death, under article 5538, did not toll a cause of action by the decedent's
mother in her own capacity. 673 S.W.2d at 345.
156. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
157. Id. at 924-25.
158. Id. at 924.
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that the court was unwilling to countenance.159 If the court had recognized
such a cause of action a normal measure of damages would have required
the court to conclude that the child was worse off alive with the defect than
he would have been if he were dead.
An action for wrongful life should be carefully distinguished from two
other types of actions: (1) an action by a child against a defendant who has
caused a defect and not merely the birth of the child, and (2) an action by
the parents for their damages caused by the birth of the child. The Texas
Supreme Court's rejection of the child's claim for wrongful life does not af-
fect either of the other two types of claims. Indeed, the supreme court, after
striking down article 4590(i), section 10.01, to the extent that it abrogated
the discovery rule, remanded for trial the mother's claim for damages that
the trial court had held was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in
article 4590(i).160
IV. NEGLIGENCE
A. Scope of Liability
In Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark161 the defendant's employee, who had a
long history of drinking on the job, became intoxicated at work. His super-
visor took him to his car in the company parking lot and sent him home.
While driving home the employee caused an accident in which the plaintiff,
who was driving another car, was killed. The plaintiff sued Otis, alleging
that it had acted negligently when it affirmatively placed an intoxicated em-
ployee on the streets. The trial court granted summary judgment for Otis on
the ground that Otis owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, with whom it had
no relationship. The Texarkana court of appeals reversed, 62 and the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.' 63
The defendant argued that its negligence, if any, was mere nonfeasance
and that it had no affirmative duty to protect motorists from its employee's
intoxication. The supreme court expressly rejected the argument that the
case was one of mere nonfeasance because Otis had affirmatively taken the
employee to his car and sent him home.164 The court also stated that if a
duty was to be imposed on Otis, the duty would not be based merely upon
knowledge of the employee's intoxication but also would be based on addi-
tional factors. 165 The court remanded the case for trial to determine
whether Otis had in fact failed to exercise reasonable care, concluding that
the standard of duty that we now adopt for this and all other cases
currently in the judicial process, is: when, because of an employee's
incapacity, an employer exercises control over the employee, the em-
159. Id. at 925.
160. Id. at 922-25.
161. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
162. 633 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), af'd, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
163. 668 S.W.2d at 311.
164. Id. at 309-10.
165. Id. at 309.
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ployer has a duty to take such action as a reasonably prudent employer
under the same or similar circumstances would take to prevent the em-
ployee from causing an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
166
This duty applies to all cases in the judicial process on November 30, 1983.
The court saw its decision as expanding existing liability rules by creating
a new duty in a narrow situation in which a duty did not previously exist. 
167
In this regard, the case affects and was affected by the current debate about
drunk driving and dram shop liability, although the court was careful to
state that Otis was not itself a dram shop case.168 The court might have
written a very different opinion by simply stating the hornbook law that
action begets a duty to act with reasonable care and that foreseeability de-
fines the scope of liability. Under this view the holding would not have
changed the law but would have merely applied existing law to a novel
situation. 69
The difference between these two approaches exemplifies a deep difference
in approaches to tort law. One approach starts with a simple rule that actors
have a duty to use reasonable care and that they are liable to foreseeable
plaintiffs for foreseeable injuries. Under this approach common cases might
be reduced to rules, such as the rule that rescuers are normally within the
scope of foreseeable risks.' 70 Moreover, countervailing policy considera-
tions, such as those underlying the rights of property owners, might support
special no-duty or limited-duty rules in certain circumstances. These special
rules, however, would be exceptions to a general rule of liability for negligent
actors who cause foreseeable injuries.
Another approach starts with a background rule that no liability exists in
a specific situation unless the courts have expressly created a special duty to
cover it. The court's reasoning in Otis reflects this approach. Thus, while
Otis expands liability in an area of great current concern, its reasoning is
inherently hostile to liability in novel situations even if the defendant failed
to use reasonable care. '
7
166. Id. at 311.
167. The prospective nature of the ruling, id., and the court's discussion of the need to
"change concepts of duty as changing social conditions occur," id. at 310, makes this point
clear.
168. Id. at 309.
169. The supreme court took the same approach last year in Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
648 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1983). In Otis the court characterized Corbin as a change in the
concept of duty in premises cases, 668 S.W.2d at 310, whereas Corbin could have been ex-
plained as a simple application of hornbook notions of duty and proximate causation. See
Powers, supra note 45, at 32-33.
170. See Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965,
writ dism'd); Reddick v. Longacre, 228 S.W.2d 264, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
171. In Appelbaum v. Nemon, 678 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Houston court of appeals held that a day care center has a duty to render
emergency aid to children in its custody. Id. at 535-36. This duty requires only that the day
care center render whatever initial care that it knows how to administer and take reasonable
steps to place the injured person in the hands of a competent doctor. Id. at 536. The day care




Punitive Damages.172 In Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers,173 a suit for defama-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated its long-standing rule that punitive
damages are not recoverable in the absence of actual damages. 174 In Hofer v.
Lavender 75 the Texas Supreme Court held that while parents are not within
the class that the Texas Constitution entitles to recover exemplary damages
in wrongful death actions,' 76 they are entitled, either as representatives or
heirs of an estate, to recover exemplary damages in an action brought under
the survival statute.' 77 The court also held that the trial court may award
exemplary damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. 78
Prejudgment Interest. Several courts of appeals reaffirmed the long-standing
rule that personal injury tort judgments should not include an award for
prejudgment interest. 179 On appeal, the supreme court in Bauer v. King 80
did not decide if pre-judgment interest should be allowed in this type of case
because the plaintiff did not plead for it. In Cavnar v. Quality Control Park-
conduct drills. Id. at 537. The duty to render aid, therefore, does not arise until after the
emergency has occurred. Id. at 536.
In Brownlee v. Holiday Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 675 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1984, no writ), the Fort Worth court of appeals held that an insured driver has a duty to a
person he injures-who is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract-not to create a
policy defense by failing to notify the insurer of the claim. Id. at 819. A breach of this duty
gives the injured third party a cause of action against the insured. Id.
172. The Fifth Circuit decided two cases involving punitive damages under Texas law. In
Bridges v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 733 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1984), the court held that
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, which provides for exemplary damages for surviving
spouses and children but not for parents and siblings, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306(5)(Vernon 1967), does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Texas
Constitutions. 733 F.2d at 1155-56. In Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 726 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1984),
the court held that courts may instruct jurors with examples of ratios of actual damages to
exemplary damages that have been approved by the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at 213-14. The
court also held that informing the jury that the Workers' Compensation Act would preclude
the plaintiff from receiving actual damages from her deceased husband's employer is not error.
Id. at 215-16.
173. 674 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1984).
174. Id. at 756.
175. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
176. Id. at 476; see TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 26 (recovery of exemplary damages in wrongful
death cases is not limited to surviving husband, widow, or heirs of decedent's body, but ex-
tends to whomever the beneficiaries of decedent's estate may be).
177. 679 S.W.2d at 476; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958) (because
of the survival statute, the death of an injured party does not bar recovery of exemplary dam-
ages, by the estate, legal representatives, or heirs).
178. 679 S.W.2d at 475-76.
179. Monsanto Co. v. Johnson, 675 S.W.2d 305, 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 548, 554 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ granted); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell, 674 S.W.2d 447,
462-63 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ granted); Bauer v. King, 674 S.W.2d 377, 379
(Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1984, rev'd on other grounds, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 306 (Mar. 20,
1985); Popkowski v. Granza, 671 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no
writ); State v. Weller, 666 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254, 267-68 (Tex: App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
180. 674 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 28 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 306 (Mar. 20, 1985).
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ing, Inc. 181 the Texas Supreme Court granted an application for writ of error
on this issue.
Emotional Harm to Bystanders. Three courts of appeals addressed issues
concerning bystander recovery for mental pain and anguish from witnessing
a wrongful death or negligently caused injury of a family member. In Bap-
tist Hospital of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber 8 2 the Beaumont court of ap-
peals followed the suggestion of the concurring justices in Sanchez v.
Schindler 83 and held that a plaintiff is not required to prove physical mani-
festations of emotional harm to recover damages for emotional trauma. 8 4
The Corpus Christi court of appeals held, in Genzer v. City of Mission, 85
that grandparents who witness an injury to their grandchild are among the
category of family members who can recover as bystanders for their own
emotional trauma even though they were not themselves within the zone of
danger.' 8 6 In Dawson v. Garcia187 the Dallas court of appeals held that a
bystander's recovery for emotional trauma derives from the physical victim's
cause of action against the tortfeasor. Thus, the bystander cannot recover
damages when the physical victim's contributory negligence exceeds fifty
percent. 8 8
C. Contribution'8 9
In Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 190 the Texas Supreme Court held that
a settling defendant has neither a right of contribution nor a right of indem-
nity against other tortfeasors.' 9' Nevertheless, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
181. 678 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ granted).
182. 672 S.W,2d 296 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ granted).
183. 651 S.W.2d 249, 258-59 (Tex. 1983) (Ray and Kilgarlin, JJ., concurring).
184. 672 S.W.2d at 298-99.
185. 666 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
186. Id. at 122. Presumably, anyone who fears for his own safety because he is in the zone
of danger can recover for emotional trauma, whether or not he is a family member.
187. 666 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
188. Id. at 259-60.
189. Federal courts decided three cases involving contribution under Texas law. In Moore
v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 737 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit held that an
employer who violated the Texas Public Utilities Act by permitting an employee to work
within six feet of a high-voltage line must indemnify the utility for any claims arising out of the
violation, including liability for the utility's own negligence. Id. at 498-500. The employee's
survivors, however, had agreed in a settlement to indemnify the employer. Thus, the
combination of indemnity obligations precluded the survivors from recovering from the utility.
Id. at 501. In Powell v. Charles Offutt Co., 576 F. Supp. 272, 278 (E.D. Tex. 1983), the court
held that a defendant could not obtain contribution from third-party defendants who the
plaintiff could not sue because the statute of limitations had run. In Singleton v. New York
Underwriters Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 198, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit held that when a
settling tortfeasor seeks contribution from other tortfeasors, courts may not, under article
2212a, sever the contribution claim from the settlement hearing. But cf Bonniwell v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. 1984) (article 2212a does not provide any right of
contribution to a joint tortfeasor who has settled the plaintiff's claim).
190. 663 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1984). Bonniwell was a products liability case, but the court
also stated that neither article 2212 nor article 2212a provides a settling tortfeasor with a right
of contribution. Id. at 819.
191. Id. at 820.
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Co. ' 92 recognized the nonstatutory right of an innocent retailer in the chain
of distribution to indemnity at common law against a product manufac-
turer.193 Similarly, in B & B Auto Supply, Sand Pit, and Trucking Co. v.
Central Freight Lines194 the Texas Supreme Court held that in negligence
cases a vicariously liable defendant is entitled to a non-statutory right of
indemnity against the actual tortfeasor. 95 Other than these narrow excep-
tions, however, contribution and indemnity are governed solely by articles
2212 and 2212a or by the system of contribution adopted in Duncan.196
Since these sources do not extend a right of contribution to a settling
tortfeasor, no such right exists.
Two courts have read Bonniwell narrowly. Beaumont Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Cain 197 and Iowa Manufacturing Co. v. Weisman Equipment Co. 198
held that if a settling tortfeasor has reduced the settlement to a judgment,
Bonniwell does not apply and contribution might be available. 199
D. Vicarious Liability2°°
Two Texas courts of appeals addressed issues concerning vicarious liabil-
ity. In Langley v. National Lead Co. 20 1 the El Paso court of appeals held
that the employer could be held vicariously liable for an injury to the em-
ployee's wife caused by the employee's negligence during the course of his
employment. 20 2 Thus, although the employee was immune from liability to
his wife under the doctrine of interspousal immunity for nonintentional
torts, the employer could not avail itself of its employee's spousal
immunity. 203
In Hunsucker v. Omega Industries2° 4 the Dallas court of appeals held that
a rebuttable presumption arises that the driver of a vehicle is an employee in
the scope of employment once the plaintiff proves that the employer owns
the vehicle. 20 5 The court declined to follow contrary holdings of other
192. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
193. Id. at 432. A retailer who is independently culpable does not have a right of indem-
nity against the manufacturer, but does have a right of contribution.
194. 603 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1980).
195. Id. at 816-17.
196. 663 S.W.2d at 819; see supra text accompanying notes 45-79.
197. 673 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, no writ).
198. 667 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ dism'd).
199. In Young v. Kilroy Oil Co., 673 S.W.2d 236, 245 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Houston court of appeals held that under maritime law a contractor
that agreed to furnish a crew and indemnify the employer from all liabilities accepted responsi-
bility for the joint negligence of the contractor and employer even though the agreement ex-
cluded any liability caused by the sole negligence of the leaseholder.
200. In Lucas v. Everman Corp., 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 491, 492 (July 11, 1984), the Texas
Supreme Court applied the alter ego doctrine to determine whether a parent corporation was
liable for the negligence and defective product of its subsidiary. The case does not develop new
law, but it provides a good example of an application of the alter ego doctrine.
201. 666 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
202. Id. at 345.
203. Id.
204. 659 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).





Three cases this year addressed governmental immunity and section 3 of
the Texas Tort Claims Act.20 7 In Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District20 8 the
plaintiff's decedent died of a heart attack after receiving an electrocardio-
gram test by a doctor employed by the defendant. The plaintiff, alleging that
the test was conducted negligently, sued the hospital district. The supreme
court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action within the waiver of
governmental immunity under section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act be-
cause the injury was caused by "some use of tangible property, real or per-
sonal, under circumstances where such unit of government, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
[Texas]."' 20 9 The hospital district argued that the waiver provisions of the
Texas Tort Claims Act required the plaintiff to show a defective condition in
the property. The court, however, held that section 3 waives immunity in
situations in which property is wrongfully used even though the property is
not itself defective.210 The court recognized that the legislature had known
of the ambiguity in section 3 since the court's decision in Lowe v. Texas Tech
University211 but had failed to resolve it.212 Moreover, the court noted that
section 13 of the Texas Tort Claims Act provided for liberal interpretation of
its provisions to achieve its intended purposes.21 3
The Austin court of appeals applied Salcedo in Smith v. University of
Texas.214 The plaintiff was injured during a track meet when he was hit by a
shot. The court held that the defendant's failure to supervise the use of the
shot put area brought the case within the requirements of section 3 of the
206. See Moreland v. Hawley Indep. School Dist., 163 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1942, no writ); Longhorn Drilling Corp. v. Adilla, 138 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1940, writ ref'd) (both holding that it would be impermissible to allow a pre-
sumption of employment of the driver and his scope of employment to arise simply from proof
that the vehicle was owned by the defendant).
207. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6262-19, § 3 (Vernon 1970) provides that:
[E]ach unit of government in the state shall be liable for money damages for
personal injuries or death when proximately caused by the negligence or wrong-
ful act or omission of any officer or employee acting within the scope of his
employment or office arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle
and motor-driven equipment, other than motor-driven equipment used in con-
nection with the operation of flood gates or water release equipment by river
authorities created under the laws of this state, under circumstances where such
officer or employee would be personally liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of this state, or death or personal injuries so caused from some
condition or some use of tangible property, real or personal, under circum-
stances where such unit of government, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of this state.
208. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983).
209. Id. at 32-33; see TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon 1970).
210. 659 S.W.2d at 31-32.
211. 540 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Tex. 1976).
212. 659 S.W.2d at 32.
213. Id., see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 13 (Vernon 1970).
214. 664 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Texas Tort Claims Act because the case involved a personal injury caused by
the negligent use of tangible property.215
In Trinity River Authority v. Williams 21 6 the plaintiffs were injured in a
boating accident on the Trinity River. They claimed that the Trinity River
Authority and the City of Houston negligently released water into the river
without providing boaters with a warning about dangerous back currents.
The court held that the City of Houston co-operated the flood gates and that
the city was negligent. 217 The City of Houston was not protected by govern-
mental immunity because supplying water to citizens is a proprietary func-
tion.218 The court also held that the operation of the flood gates by the
Trinity River Authority fell within the waiver of governmental immunity of
section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act.219 Section 3 of the Act provides for
a waiver of governmental immunity for damages arising from the negligent
operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment. 220
Furthermore, the express exception to this waiver for motor-driven equip-
ment used in the operation of flood gates or water release equipment by river
authorities was not applicable. 221 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs
failed to allege that the operation of water release equipment was negligently
performed. 222 Rather, they based their claim on the failure to warn of dan-
gerous back currents and the failure to maintain a barrier cable across the
river. 223 If this exception to the waiver of governmental immunity in section
3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act is inapplicable, the reason is unclear why the
waiver of governmental immunity is itself applicable since the waiver is also
predicated upon the use of motor-driven equipment. Nevertheless, the court
held that the river authority was not protected by governmental
immunity. 224
F Causation
In Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. 225 the plaintiff obtained a default judg-
ment for injuries caused by chemical fumes emitted by a typesetting machine
in the defendant's office. At a damages estimate hearing pursuant to Texas
215. Id. at 187-90; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon 1970).
216. 659 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1983), affid in part, rev'd in part, 28 Tex.
Supp. Ct. J. 264 (Feb. 27, 1985).
217. 659 S.W.2d at 719.
218. Id. at 720; see City of Houston v. Bush, 566 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beamont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Waco v. Busby, 396 S.W.2d 469, 470-71 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Boiles v. City of Abilene, 276 S.W.2d 922, 924-25 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1955, writ ref'd).
219. 659 S.W.2d at 723.
220. Id; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon 1970). See supra note 207
for full text of the statute.
221. 659 S.W.2d at 723.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. The Texas Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals' decision concerning gov-
ernmental immunity, but reversed the court's finding of no contributory negligence. 28 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. at 265.
225. 675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984).
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Rule of Civil Procedure 243226 the defendant argued that the plaintiff was
required to prove that the fumes caused her injuries. The plaintiff responded
that the causal connection between the fumes and her injuries was a matter
of causation; thus, the default judgment already had proven causation con-
clusively when it established liability. The court agreed with the defendant
by distinguishing between two aspects of causation.227 First, the plaintiff
must establish a causal link between the defendant's conduct or product and
the event that causes injury, in this case the emission of chemical fumes.228
This link falls under the category of causation. Either proximate causation
or producing causation, depending upon whether the case is based on negli-
gence or strict tort liability, defines the causal nexus. 229 The link between
the event sued upon and the harm to the plaintiff, however, is an element of
damages. 230 Consequently, the plaintiff must present evidence of this second
causal relationship at a damage hearing.
23
'
The court's distinction seems dubious. The mere emission of fumes does
not create a cause of action if the fumes have not injured the plaintiff. Con-
sequently, showing that the fumes caused some form of injury is a necessary
element of liability. The default judgment should conclusively establish this
element. While the extent or measure of the plaintiff's damages might be
distinguished from causation, the link between the defendant's conduct or
product and some form of injury is a necessary element of liability. Within
the context of Morgan the court's distinction may be innocuous. The plain-
tiff was merely required to prove a causal link between the fumes and her
injury. More significantly, Morgan suggests that the proximate cause stan-
dard, including the element of foreseeability, does not apply to the causal
link between the fumes and the plaintiff's injury. For example, a negligently
maintained piece of office equipment could foreseeably emit fumes but not
cause injury. The fumes might simply smell bad. The distinction in Morgan
renders the unforseeability of the injury irrelevant because the proximate
causation standard, including the element of foreseeability, would apply only
to the causal link between the machine and the emission of fumes. Courts
will probably limit Morgan to its specific facts in the context of the rule 243
requirement of proving damages after a default judgment.
G. Unavoidable Accident
In Lemos v. Montez232 the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred by adding to the correct definition of unavoidable accident the addi-
tional instruction that the mere occurrence of a motor vehicle collision is not
226. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243 (a damages estimate hearing is allowed when the cause of action
is unliquidated or is not proved by written instrument).
227. 675 S.W.2d at 731.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 30 & 31.
230. 675 S.W.2d at 731.
231. Id; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 243.
232. 680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984).
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evidence of negligence. 233 The court also held that, in the special issue ask-
ing the jury which party's negligence was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent, the trial court erred in giving "neither" as one of the possible
alternative answers.23 4 This form of submission, the court held, was
equivalent to an issue on unavoidable accident that should not have been
submitted, both because it is an inferential rebuttal issue and because the
evidence did not raise the possibility of unavoidable accident. 235 Moreover,
when unavoidable accident is an issue, the correct submission is to include
the correct definition of unavoidable accident and then ask:
Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the
evidence proximately caused the collision made the basis of this suit?
ANSWER: Plaintiff (Yes-) (No-)
Defendant (Yes -) (No -).
To include opinions of "both" or "neither" is error.
236
233. Id. at 801.
234. Id. at 800.
235. Id.
236. See id..
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